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There is a vast amount of literature concerning the integration of action and cognition.
Although this broad research area is of great interest for many disciplines like sports,
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, only a few attempts tried to bring together
different perspectives so far. Our goal is to provide a perspective to spark a debate
across theoretical borders and integration of different disciplines via psychophysiology.
In order to boost advances in this research field it is not only necessary to become aware
of the different areas that are relevant but also to consider methodological aspects and
challenges. We briefly describe the most relevant theoretical accounts to the question
of how internal and external information processes or factors interact and, based on
this, argue that research programs should consider the three dimensions: (a) dynamics
of movements; (b) multivariate measures and; (c) dynamic statistical parameters. Only
with an extended perspective on theoretical and methodological accounts, one would
be able to integrate the dynamics of actions into theoretical advances.
Keywords: psychophysiology, cognition, action, decision making, performance monitoring, embodiment
A BRIEF DEFINITION OF ACTION
Imagine Wladimir Klitschko, one of the most successful heavyweight boxing champions of all
times, aiming at winning his next boxing match. To win the fight he has to plan and execute
different actions that are embedded in a continuous stream of ongoing behavior. A precise
definition of action is difficult given its manifold manifestations. Some actions can be characterized
as ephemeral, like a hook during the fight. Other actions are more complex and enduring, like
“winning the match,” and could be seen as a sum of sequential actions. The question of how to
separate single actions is often solved by determining their underlying goals (Herwig et al., 2013;
Künzell et al., 2017). In this vein, goals can either be within the perceptual range (e.g., hitting the
opponent’s rib cage with the fist) or in anticipated future states that cannot yet be perceived in the
environment (e.g., winning this match to become the leader of one’s weight division). According
to Prinz (2013), goals can be “hot” and require active intervention to achieve them (e.g., sidestep
to a counter strike) or they can be “cold” and temporally uncritical (e.g., increasing one’s stamina).
Herwig et al. (2013) stated that “an action starts with the first behavioral activity directed toward
a particular goal and ends with the achievement of the goal” (p. 106). To achieve a goal, external
and internal factors must be geared toward the prospective goal state. For our Klitschko example,
this would mean that actions might be influenced by internal factors like fitness level, accuracy, and
speed of punches or by external factors such as the opponent being southpaw or noise and lighting
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conditions in the arena. In extension to the definition of Herwig
et al. (2013), we propose that the dynamics of movements and
behavioral activity, defined as one element of action besides
goals, need to be further specified and partitioned. We suggest
that a psychophysiological perspective on actions extends the
existing definition by offering an explanation of how internal
and external factors interact. Thus, a perspective on integrating
action and cognition has to ask the questions: Which are the
relevant mechanisms that initiate, guide, and evaluate action?
And which methodological challenges arise when the aim is to
integrate mind and motion? Answering these questions requires
a consideration of different theoretical accounts, but also of new
technical developments and methodological advances.
CORE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS
RELATED TO THE INTERPLAY OF
ACTION AND COGNITION
Multi-Sensory Integration
Most action is embedded in a rich perceptual environment
and perceptual inputs coming from different input modalities
have to be integrated to allow proper action selection. Multi-
sensory integration is a crucial physiological theory that has,
for instance, explained psycho-physiological phenomena such as
the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) or the
McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). Multi-sensory
integration addresses the perceptual binding problem (Milner,
1974; Mioche and Singer, 1989), which considers the question
of how neural inputs from different modalities (e.g., vision,
audition, olfaction) are integrated into one coherent, valid, and
robust perceptual experience (Spence, 2011). The neurobiological
bases of multi-sensory integration are bi- or multimodal neurons
that are excited by more than one input modality existing in a
large number of brain areas, such as the somatosensory cortex
(Stein et al., 2009). Various complementing principles have been
formulated for multi-sensory integration. The principle of visual
dominance postulates that vision has a greater influence on the
other senses than vice versa (Witten and Knudsen, 2005) the
principle of modality appropriateness claims that cross-modal
influences depend on the modality’s appropriateness for a given
task (Welch and Warren, 1980). Finally, the principle of Bayesian
integration postulates that the brain uses a form of Bayesian
inference to integrate multimodal information into a coherent
perception of the world (Deneve and Pouget, 2004).
Embodied Cognition
The concept of embodied cognition assumes strong interactions
between cognition, perception, and movement (Shapiro, 2010;
Fischer and Coello, 2015), implying they cannot be studied
independently of each other. In recent years, more and more
evidence pointed to a considerable plasticity of the brain
with respect to the integration of body parts (Blanke, 2012).
Embodied cognition theories assume that the “self ” emerges from
the integration of bodily and/or environmental information.
This information consists of visual, tactile, proprioceptive,
vestibular, auditory, olfactory, visceral, and motor inputs
(Blanke, 2012). Thus, embodied cognition is, at least from a
neuroscience perspective, closely connected to multi-sensory
integration. A recent study by Collins et al. (2016) showed that
synchronizing stimulation of the hand somatosensory cortex and
observed touches of a corresponding prosthetic hand created
the perception of ownership of the artificial limb. From a
psychological perspective, there is agreement that cognitive
functions can only be understood when considering their
relevance for actions (Wilson, 2002). To sum up, embodied
cognition approaches postulate that cognitive processes are
embodied and hypothesize that an individual’s bodily state (and
its capacities and skills) and the environment interact (Rowlands,
2010).
Decision Making
Prior to acting, one needs to decide to do so. However,
theoretical concepts of decision making often neglect the fact that
cognitive and motor processes are intertwined. Some approaches
describe decisions as heuristics, with strategies formally defined
as building blocks, i.e., a search-, stop-, and decision-rule. The
mere composition of cognitive building blocks reveals that the
involvement of the sensorimotor system is widely ignored. An
exception to this is the simple heuristic approach, which claims
that a simple heuristic applied to option generation and decision
making in complex sports behavior considers the building
block of execution (de Oliveira et al., 2014). The execution
rule addresses the question of which action to carry out and,
more importantly, how to execute it with the motor system
(Raab et al., 2005; de Oliveira et al., 2014). In our opinion,
the intertwined motor and cognitive components of decisions,
which have been theoretically discussed and coined in the light of
motor control (Wolpert and Landy, 2012) or “embodied choices”
(Raab, 2017), should be empirically studied and incorporated
into theories of the psychophysiology of movement. To reach
this goal, psychophysiological models of motor heuristics and
embodied choices have to be formulated. Different models of
the psychophysiology of movement have been studied in animals
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) and humans (Wichary and Smolen,
2016) and can serve as a starting point for theory testing,
integration, and development. Now, neuroscientific studies
integrating different methodological challenges (Kyathanahally
et al., 2017) target decision making (Chand and Dhamala, 2017;
Muraskin et al., 2017), and find correlations of decision making
and somatosensory networks (Harris and Lim, 2016), however,
the aspect of movement or “real” (i.e., dynamic) action is still
rarely taken into account. We return to this point when outlining
current methodological developments.
Psychophysiology of Action and
Cognitive Control
The literature concerning this topic is far too vast and
complex to be laid down in detail here. Thus, we stick to
the core mechanisms that seem relevant in this regard. From
a neurophysiological point of view prefrontal cortex (PFC),
motor cortex and basal ganglia networks and their corresponding
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neurotransmitter systems are crucial for action and cognition.
More specifically, for task performance (“blocking and punching”
to stick to the initial example) the stability of information in
the PFC is crucial. Within these networks, there are structures
and functions relevant for the evaluation of goal states. That
is, for example, the allocation of attention to task-relevant
features. On a rather simple level, the establishment of goals
refers to efficient stimulus-response mappings concerning the
task at hand, or, coming back to the initial example: “Move
right arm up if left shoulder of the opponent indicates a
punch.” But how do we keep track of our action goals on a
neurophysiological level, and how are decisions implemented
while acting? Working memory is crucial: the before-mentioned
task-goal representations are being kept “online” within PFC
networks (Jonides et al., 2008) via dopaminergic mediated activity
states (Seamans and Yang, 2004). These assumptions match
another idea: the reinforcement learning hypothesis (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002). It assumes that within the PFC, dopamine
(DA) is a kind of “gating signal” that is involved in keeping
and adapting goal-state relations via reinforcement learning
mechanisms (Miller, 2000). There exists considerable literature
concerning connections of the PFC with parietal junctions
(dorsolateral-prefrontal network) and how these networks
control a variety of cognitive functions like motor planning,
working memory, or allocation of attention. Ptak et al. (2017)
have claimed that the core mechanism for motor planning
(i.e., action planning) is action emulation. They argue that
this emulation consists of a dynamic representation of abstract
movement kinematics that sustains its internal manipulation.
Thereby, it ensures its maintenance over short time periods.
Further, it can be assumed that this dorsolateral prefrontal
network has evolved from a motor control network to a general
system supporting motor and cognitive functions. Related to the
impact of actions, a recent account by Peterburs and Desmond
(2016) suggests the cerebellum, the core structure for movement
execution and motor adaptation, to play a crucial role in sensory
prediction, error and conflict processing, response inhibition,
as well as feedback learning. Here we return to the idea of
embodied cognition: the key aspect of understanding cognition
might be, not only from a psychological but also from a
psychophysiological perspective, action. The neurophysiological
mechanisms of action and the corresponding mechanisms related
to the interaction with the environment are at the core of
cognition.
Interoceptive and Exteroceptive
Changes
Finally, using our example with Klitschko, interoceptive and
exteroceptive changes produced by actions can be considered
dynamically interacting. For instance, muscle tension cannot be
maintained after a series of punches (interoceptive change), and
Klitschko’s opponent can positively influence the estimations of
his chances to win by falling after a good punching sequence
(exteroceptive change). One can argue that actions could be
considered body movements which depend on external and
internal factors. Such actions produce re-afferent feedback to
interoceptive (generated within the body) and exteroceptive
(generated outside the body) change. For instance, in a model of
Schubotz (2007) these changes are meant to appear dynamically
during movements. She defines interoceptive changes as
proprioception (sense of the relative position of the body parts),
visceroception (sense of the inner organs), equilibrioception
(sense of balance) and nociception (sense from organs, joints, and
bones). For complex actions, vision, audition, haptic and other
senses are used to detect exteroceptive changes. Whereas we see
a current trend in multi-sensory integration research (Greenlee,
2017), less knowledge is gained for the complex interaction of
combining interoceptive and exteroceptive changes and their
respective measures in one research program (Suzuki et al., 2013).
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
RELATED TO INTEGRATING ACTION
AND COGNITION
Besides the theoretical challenges that arise when taking the
dynamics of actions into account, one of the core problems is the
operationalization of the corresponding constructs. Nowadays
there is a considerable amount of technical possibilities, however,
only a few are used in dynamic contexts, or only in isolated
paradigms measuring certain aspects. We think that more than
static measurement of actions is required. For instance, in most
classical experimental settings response times are measured or
areas under the curve of a movement pattern are extracted, but
temporal information provided by modern hard- and software is
rarely taken into account. Further, these “static” measurements
are often being analyzed independently of each other, e.g.,
response times are analyzed separate from EEG parameters, and
are rarely integrated into attempts to solve theoretical questions
(Debener, 2005; Hoffmann and Falkenstein, 2010; Plewan et al.,
2016). Finally, many studies focus on central parameters like
mean values or compare variances. However, in cognitive
neuroscience a lot of measures have been developed which make
it possible to describe the temporal dynamics of signals, e.g., time-
frequency analysis, non-linear dynamics, or cross-coherence. We
suggest a three-dimensional perspective integrating static and
dynamic measurements, single and multiple measurements, and
dynamics of statistics used. Anyway, the attempt to provide a
comprehensive description of all possible methods would be too
ambitious. In the following we will therefore describe essential
aspects of this three-dimensional perspective and exemplify each
aspect by selected methods.
From Static to a Dynamic Measurement
of Action
The use of “static” measurements has a long tradition in
psychology and is closely connected to the concept of the
measurement error (Lord, 1959; Novick, 1966; Rozeboom et al.,
1969). In experimental research (as in any empirical research)
two types of errors, systematic and random error, might arise.
By controlling the experimental setup, one hopes to control
for errors or at least keep them constant. This has been
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achieved with rather static devices: The measurement error (of
the device) in simple button presses can be easily controlled.
Also, measuring psychophysiological variables can be quite tricky
due to the sensitivity of the systems to movement artifacts or
other artifact sources. In psychophysiology the term “signal-
to-noise ratio” describes this relation of true value and error.
To keep this ratio at optimum, the influence of artifacts can
be kept low if the participant does not move strongly. Related
to the aspect of how to deal with artifacts and how to report
them, precise recommendations exist (Keil et al., 2013). Anyway,
in former days, measurement instruments did not have the
same high precision modern systems have, e.g., eye-tracking
systems with high. Also, it was not possible to measure “online,”
that is, in more dynamic settings. This was due to the before
mentioned problems, but also because it was not possible to
measure remotely electromyographic or EEG data. In recent
years solutions to these problems, for example, mobile EEG
(Vos and Debener, 2014; Wascher et al., 2014) or even mobile
brain/body imaging (Makeig, 2009; Banaei et al., 2017) have been
put forward. Some of these systems show an excellent signal-
to-noise ratio (Radüntz, 2018). However, many studies rather
focus on “static” measurements like button presses to indicate
choices. Only a few researchers integrate dynamic measures like
eye-movements (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). These dynamic
measures could be highly relevant in order to model for example
“true” action adaptation, like the change of direction of a
movement during execution. We argue that due to this technical
evolution more dynamic measurements should be taken into
account since they provide a more fine-graded analysis of the
mechanisms involved.
From Single to Multiple Measurements
If one takes into account dynamic measurements, it seems
straightforward to make corresponding inferences concerning
the number of dependent variables that are being taken into
account. Obviously, one has to be aware of the problem that:
(a) one has to carefully select variables meaningful for the
research question at hand and (b) to control for the problem of
alpha error inflation. However, recent advances in statistics and
neurosciences promise to integrate measures that might not only
bring together different approaches but also provide new insights.
One of these developments is, for example, the increasing usage
of multivariate statistics to model artifact and neural sources
(Jung et al., 2000). With these techniques it is even possible to
integrate different measurements like simultaneous EEG-fRMI
(Debener et al., 2006; Diukova et al., 2008; Sajda, 2009; Hoffmann
et al., 2013; Dizaji and Soltanian-Zadeh, 2017). For a detailed and
extended overview of methodological advances, the reader might
refer to a recent research topic edited by Gramann et al. (2014).
From Static to Dynamic Parameters
With “static” we refer to the assumption that the mean is an
estimate of the “true” value of some operationalized concept.
This assumption holds when any non-systematic variation
is distributed normally around the “true” value and that
with increasing sample size such variation approximates zero.
Shortly described it is aimed to minimize the measurement
error. For instance in response times experiments, the mean
response times are assumed to estimate the “true response
time” with respect to some experimental condition. The logic
behind that is: If the cognitive (or neural) system responds
to a stimulus, the response consists of the “true” response
and the error. With increasing number of trials, this error
is being statistically minimized. However, a vast amount of
literature presenting alternative statistical parameters, capturing
the variability of responses, has emerged. Indeed, this variability
of responses might be modulated and might indicate variations
in the processes of interest. One way to capture it are for
example ex-Gaussians. They provide good fits of empirical
response time distributions (Spieler et al., 1996; Matzke and
Wagenmakers, 2009) and they allow descriptions of differences
between conditions reflected in shifting and/or skewing of
the RT distribution. Group differences can be more easily
detected compared to classical approaches using Gaussian
parameters like the mean. Other important approaches are
drift-diffusion models (Ratcliff, 2013) and hierarchical drift-
diffusion models (Lee and Wagenmakers, 2009; Wiecki et al.,
2013). With drift-diffusion models one can basically model
psychological parameters, e.g., information accumulation and
decision threshold, by taking into account statistical parameters
of response time distributions (Ratcliff, 2013). In sum, they have a
long tradition in psychology, and recent advances integrate these
accounts into neuroscience (Mulder et al., 2013; Forstmann et al.,
2016).
A PERSPECTIVE ON INTEGRATING
COGNITION AND ACTION
This headline promises much, and for sure a single, broad
perspective will not provide a solution for “everything.”
However, we believe that a research program related to
the integration of action and cognition, be it related to
embodiment or cognitive control, should at least consider
the literature of the fields mentioned herein but also consider
methodological and theoretical advances from other fields.
Indeed, more and more studies integrate concepts and methods
from different fields (Cohen and Cavanagh, 2011; Cavanagh
et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2014; Stock et al., 2016). For
instance, Kiverstein and Miller (2015) described how an
integration of neuroscience and embodiment could be laid
down but there was a focus on the integration of emotion
and cognition. Hence, the core ideas of embodiment, that
the body and actions are relevant for cognition (Wilson,
2002), has not been derived in detail yet. Coming back to
the initial boxing example, it gets clear that the question
of how Klitschko got to some strategic decisions cannot be
answered without considering the interaction of interoceptive
and exteroceptive information. Also, the effect of cognition
during the fight cannot be investigated without using
dynamic and multivariate measures, since the interaction
of these intero- and exteroceptive changes might depend
exactly on that setting. Also, this situation may affect neural
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mechanisms of cognitive control. Having a look at the different
streams of literature in the research areas of multi-sensory
integration, embodied cognition, decision making, and the neural
base of cognitive control, one can only conclude that the fields
have to become aware of advances in the respective other fields.
For example, there is a huge amount of research related to
what decision making is and why it works as it does but the
investigation of how our neural system processes decisions and how
all the processes are integrated “online” has not yet been developed
in depth. We think that a psychophysiological perspective on
actions extends existing definitions by offering the opportunity to
find an explanation of how internal and external factors interact.
Any perspective on integrating action and cognition should strive
to find answers to the question about the relevant mechanisms
that initiate, guide, and evaluate action.
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